Nine months before the first line of code
The idea dates from August 2025. Development did not start until May 2026.
The months in between went into the concept: defining the problem, pressure-testing the model, and pivoting once — substantially, and on paper. That sequence was deliberate, and it is the part of the process I would most want to be judged on. The riskiest thing about this product was never whether it could be built.
What I actually did
Domain framing. I mapped the existing ways this help gets arranged today — informal networks, home-care agencies, classifieds and Facebook groups — and looked at what each one gives up. Informal help is trusted but unaccountable and unfindable. Agencies are accountable but oversized and slow. Classifieds are findable but carry no trust at all. No option holds all three at once.
Adjacent-product analysis. I looked at how general task marketplaces and on-demand platforms solve matching, and concluded that most of their patterns are the wrong ones to copy here. They optimise for speed, price comparison and low commitment. Care needs close to the opposite: verification, accountability, and a slower, more deliberate path to commitment. Borrowing a food-delivery checkout pattern for this would be actively harmful.
Assumption mapping. Rather than pretend to have validated findings, I wrote down what had to be true for the product to work and ranked the assumptions by risk. The riskiest one was not "will people want this" — it was:
Trust, not supply or demand, is the binding constraint. If we can manufacture trust credibly, the marketplace works. If we cannot, nothing else matters.
Everything else in the product was then designed as an answer to that assumption. That is why verification, escrow, session reports and dispute resolution exist before nicer discovery or a mobile app.
Putting it in front of people who owed it nothing
Through that period I put SeniGo through external programmes rather than keeping it on paper.
I entered IAPMEI's StartUp Voucher twice, and was selected both times. I took up neither place — I was studying full time, which made the commitment the programme requires impossible. I also applied to an acceleration programme at Startup Leiria and was not accepted.
None of this is user research and I will not dress it up as such: a jury is not a customer, and being selected is not evidence that anyone wants the product. What it did do was force the argument to be made repeatedly, in a fixed amount of time, to commercially-minded strangers with no investment in being convinced.
That is where the original model came apart. Defending anyone can sign up to help to people whose first instinct is to look for the liability made it obvious that the answer I had was not good enough.
The pivot: from "anyone can help" to "only through an institution"
The original model was open. Anyone could register as a companion, pass a verification check, and start accepting work — a conventional peer-to-peer marketplace.
I abandoned it before development started. The reason was risk.
In an open model, the platform's only defence is a check performed once, at signup. If that check is wrong, or if someone changes after passing it, nothing else stands between a stranger and a vulnerable person alone in their home. A criminal-record check on day one says nothing about day two hundred. The platform ends up carrying full responsibility for a danger it has no continuing ability to see.
The change: a companion reaches the platform through a certified institution — a care home, day centre, care company or clinic — that vouches for them, manages them, and has its own name attached to their conduct.
What that buys is not a stronger check. It is continuing accountability, from an organisation that is inspectable, contactable, and has considerably more to lose than an individual does. It moves the product from we verified this person once to an institution stands behind this person.
It also changed everything downstream at once: the homepage now leads with "trusted care through certified institutions" rather than a list of profiles; supply acquisition became a B2B problem rather than a consumer one; and the information architecture grew a fourth role.
It is the single decision I would defend hardest, and the one that took longest to arrive at.
What I did not do — stated plainly
I did not run user interviews. I did not run usability testing with older adults. I did not run surveys, diary studies or any form of moderated session, and I have no quantitative data because the product has not been put in front of real users.
That means everything in this case study about senior usability is informed judgement, not evidence. It is reasoned from the domain and from accessibility practice, and it is exactly the kind of reasoning that usability testing exists to puncture.
This step could be deepened through:
- 5–8 moderated sessions with adults aged 70+, ideally on their own devices in their own homes, watching the discovery → booking flow unassisted
- Parallel sessions with adult children, to see where the two audiences actually diverge
- Interviews with informal caregivers about how they currently find work and get paid
- Conversations with two or three care institutions, since the whole institutional model rests on an untested assumption about their appetite to participate
I would expect that research to invalidate several things I currently believe. That is the point of doing it.